genuine if unfashionable affection (see also 1962, 1996).

Goody has proved an exceptionally prolific writer. His work is very wide-ranging in its scope, combining broad comparisons across half the globe with more narrowly focused ethnographic studies. It is explicitly not, however, grand theory, for Goody prefers the "middle-range theories" associated with the sociologist Merton (1949, ch. 2), in which generalizations can be based on a more manageable range of sources. In general, he treats anthropology as a cumulative science, in which results are assembled from which enduring theoretical perspectives can be developed. Often counted among the FUNCTIONALISTS, it is noticeable that he is not afraid to take account of material factors in discussing social organization, such as WRITING and agricultural techniques in FOOD PRODUCTION. RP

See also COOKING, FOOD SYSTEMS, SUCCESSION, WRITING SYSTEMS

further reading J. Goody 1991

government is most broadly defined as a system of rules for maintaining social order. Such rules may be implicit or explicit, codified in writing or a matter of oral record only. Much of the debate in anthropology has focused on whether government requires visible institutions with power to implement its rules, or whether it can exist in societies where there are specific nodes of authority. In this debate one of the key problems has been the identification (and confusion) of government with the state.

Nineteenth-century theorists such as Sir Henry MAINE (1861) and Lewis Henry MORGAN (1877) had argued that simple societies with common property, where relations were status oriented and kin based, had evolved into more complex societies with private property where order was predicated on contractual ties and territorially based administration. In such schemes recognizable governmental institutions were a characteristic of "civilized" societies, while "primitive" societies lacked them.

British FUNCTIONALIST anthropologists such as Meyer FORTES and E. E. EVANS-PRITCHARD rejected the evolutionary schema of their predecessors but kept many of its categories. They were keen to sort out the dynamics of what they saw as two distinct types of African society: centralized and noncentralized. The first were characterized by "centralized authority, administrative machinery, and judicial institutions – in short, a government," and "cleavages of wealth, privilege, and status correspond[ed] to the distribution of power and authority." The second included "those societies which lack[ed] centralized authority, administrative machinery, and constituted judicial institutions – in short which lack[ed] government," and "there [were] no sharp divisions of rank, status, or wealth" (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1940a: 5).

This distinction did not mean that politics was lacking in noncentralized societies. Indeed, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard inspired a generation of fieldworkers to locate politics in societies that lacked government by their definition. In so doing, however, they also undermined their own typology and the rigor with which "government" could be defined. As more descriptions of political systems in acephalous societies accumulated, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's yardstick for what comprised a government came to look increasingly like the trappings of a STATE, not government itself. Their own work on stateless societies among the Nuer and Tallensi suggested that people with no bureaucracy still managed to conduct their affairs and govern themselves quite effectively, and according to clear rules (Evans-Pritchard 1940; Fortes 1945). So, was it really government that such societies lacked, or simply the state?

Lucy Mair (1962: 16) argued that Fortes and Evans-Pritchard had indeed perpetuated a false dichotomy by neglecting a basic question: what does government do? Her answer was that

> it protects members of the political community against lawlessness within and enemies without; and it takes decisions on behalf of the community in matters which concern them all, and in which they have to act together.

Accordingly, Mair rejected the notion that there could be any society without a government. Even the most "primitive" societies had government, if only of a minimal type that might result from the small size of the community, the paucity and impermanence of recognized leadership positions, or the inability of leaders to consistently and uniformly exert their authority. To make her case, Mair chose to single out the nomadic Nuer as a "supreme example" of a society possessing minimal government, despite the fact that Evans-Pritchard was their ethnographer and had declared that they lacked government. But using Evans-Pritchard's own data, Mair argued that because the Nuer share clear rules for redressing wrongs, and have recognizable leaders who achieve respect, even if they cannot command obedience, they do have a government (1962: 61–2).

A more subtle problem not addressed in these debates is the question of what rules apply to an individual and what constitutes legitimacy of governments, however defined. For example Edmund LEACH (1954) noted that in northern Burma the lowland Shan had a stratified society with fixed social roles, while the neighboring highland Kachin villages oscillated between hierarchical and egalitarian phases, each with different sets of rules. Who and what then comprised government for a Kachin (never mind "the" Kachin) depended on where in the system the individual happened to be at a particular moment in time. This, of course, raises a problem with which inhabitants of state systems are experientially familiar: despite the state's claims of singularity, most individuals are bound to other sets of rules (religious, cultural, ethnic, etc.) that govern behavior in ways that are often contradictory. In this way the anthropological debate about the nature of government has come full circle. Early anthropologists assumed that government in state systems was clear because it was institutionalized and so needed no explication, while societies without formal institutions demanded close inspection to see how they worked. Today anthropologists have realized that the formal institutions of government in state systems are hardly as fixed or clear as their predecessors assumed and demand the same level of attentive deconstruction that was once devoted to the Nuer. ASi

See also LAW, LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY, POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

further reading Balandier 1970

grammar The grammar of a LANGUAGE or DIALECT or idiolect is (1) the set of generalizations about the way the sound and meaning of expressions in the variety are connected; (2) an encoding, in a metalanguage, of some portion of the grammar for that variety. The metalanguage can be some ordinary language, like English, supplemented by special technical terms (like *agent*, *state*, *verb*, *constituent*, *subject*, *person*, *obstruent*, and *mora*) or a formalism specially devised for the purpose. Descriptive linguists write grammars (in sense 2) as approximations to the grammar (in sense 1).

The grammar of a variety is naturally divisible into several parts, or components, each of which has an organization of its own: SEMANTICS (concerned with meaning), phonetics (concerned with the acoustic and articulatory properties of sounds, see PHONEMES), and at least three mediating components – PHONOLOGY (treating the way differences in sound are systematically used to signal differences in meaning), morphology (treating the part of the sound–meaning relationship that follows from the internal structure of words), and SYNTAX (treating the part of the sound–meaning relationship that follows from the way larger expressions – phrases, clauses, and sentences – are organized out of words).

The grammar of a variety is only one part of what its speakers know about it. In addition to the grammar, there are, at least, a lexicon (the set of words); a set of principles for the organization of discourse; a set of principles for effective language use; a set of associations between aspects of the grammar and the lexicon, on the one hand, and sociocontextual factors like generation, gender, social class, formality, and politeness, on the other hand; and all kinds of knowledge about how to construct special-purpose discourses (e.g., sonnets, newspaper headlines, recipes, knock-knock jokes).

Edward SAPIR (1921: 38) observed, "Unfortunately, or luckily, no language is